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PARTIES TO THIS ACTION 
THE APPELLANT 
The Appellant in this action is Hartford Leasing Corporation 
who is the owner of a commercial building situated in the City of 
Moab, Grand County, State of Utah. 
THE APPELLEES 
Appellee State of Utah entered into a leasing agreement with 
the Appellant to lease space in Appellant's commercial building 
in the City of Moab, Grand County, State of Utah. 
Appellee Rio Vista Oil Company, is a Utah Corporation which 
operates in the City of Moab, Grand County, State of Utah a gas 
station known as Moab U-Serve and also known as Stars Food Store. 
Appellee La Sal Oil Company is a Utah Corporation which 
operates in the City of Moab, Grand County, State of Utah, a gas 
station known as Gordon's Sinclair. 
Defendant Dependable Janitorial Service has been dismissed 
from this action. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Parties to This Action i 
Table of Contents ii 
Table of Authorities iii-iv 
Statement of Jurisdiction 1 
Statement of Issues Presented and Standards of Review 1-2 
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 2-3 
Statement of the Case 3-9 
Procedural History 3 
Factual History 3-9 
Summary of The Argument 9 
Argument 10-38 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ACCEPTING AND 
RULING ON THE APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS WHEN THE 
APPELLEES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS 
OF RULE 4-506(3) OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 10-20 
A. Rule 4-506(3) 1--16 
B. Gardiner's Notice of Withdrawal 16-20 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED 
APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO PROSECUTE 20-31 
1. The Conduct of Both Parties 20-
24 2. The Opportunity Each Party Has Had To 
Move This Case 
Forward 2 
4-25 
3. What Each Party Has Done to Move The 
Case Forward 25-27 
4. What Difficulty or Prejudice May Have Occurred To 
The Other Side 27-29 
5. Whether Injustice May Result From Dismissal.29-31 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE 
APPELLEES' MOTIONS TO DISMISS WHERE THE APPELLANT HAD 
OBTAINED NEW COUNSEL WHO HAD REACTIVATED 
THIS CASE 31-32 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE 
APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
WITH PREJUDICE 32-34 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
HOLD A HEARING PRIOR TO DECIDING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO 
DISMISS WHEN THE APPELLANT REQUESTED SUCH A HEARING 
PURSUANT TO RULE 4-501(3)(b) OF THE UTAH CODE OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 34-36 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
INTERPRETING RULE 4-501 OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION BY FAILING TO CONSIDER APPELLANT'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES WHICH 
APPELLANT SUBMITTED PRIOR TO THE COURT RULING OF 
APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO PROSECUTE 37-38 
CONCLUSION 38-39 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES AND RULES 
§78-2-2 (3) (j) , Utah Code Annotated (1993) 1 
Rule 4-501 Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration 2,9, 34-38 
Rule 4-506 Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration 2, 9-13, 14, 19, 38 
Rule 103-3 Rules of Practice for The Federal District 
Court District of Utah 3, 18, 19 
Rule 10, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 18 
Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 3, 32 
Section 286, California Code of Civil Procedure 3, 15 
UTAH CASES 
Utah Supreme Court 
Sperrv v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 1984) 1, 12, 14 
K.L.C., Inc. v. McLean, 656 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 1982) 20 
Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977) 23 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor. Inc.,544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) 30 
Johnson v. Firebrand. 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977) 31, 32 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 
740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987) cert, denied 765 P.2d 
1277 (Utah 1987) 1, 2 
Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Utah Department 
of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Utah App. 1993) 1, 2, 32, 33 
Gillmor v. Cummincrs, 806 P. 2d 1205 (Utah App. 1991) 2 
Bettinqer v. Bettinqer, 793 P.2d 389, 391 (Utah App. 1990) 2 
Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1989) 20 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 
26-27 (Utah App. 1991) 33 
OTHER JURISDICTION CASES 
McMunn v. Lehrke, 155 P. 473, 476 (Cal App. 3 Dist. 1915) 15 
Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co., 170 Cal App 725, 
216 Cal. Rptr. 300 (Cal App. 2 Dist. 1985) 15 
Larking v. Superior Court, 171 Cal 719, 154 P. 841 (1916) 15 
Lister v. Superior Court, 98 Cal App. 3d 64, 70 
159 Cal Rptr 280 (1979) 15 
Hazen v. Williams, 30 So2d 522 (Fla 1947) 23 
Jepson v. New, 792 P.2d 728, 735 (Ariz 1990) 29 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONTINUED) 
MISCELLANEOUS 
The World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 13, Field 
Enterprises, Inc. (1957) 17 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 17 
Harbrace College Handbook, Chapter 32, pp. 311-313 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Publishers (1986) 17 
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition 17 
v 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The specific statutory authority that confers jurisdiction 
in this Court in this matter is 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Annotated, 
1993. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE No. 1: Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by 
accepting and ruling on the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss when the 
Appellees' failed to comply with the Notice provisions of Rule 4-
506(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration? The standard 
of review is whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by 
failing to comply with the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Sperrv v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 1984). 
ISSUE No. 2: Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by 
granting the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute? The standard of review is whether the Trial Court 
abused its discretion in granting the Appellees' Motion to 
Dismiss. Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 
P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 
1987). 
ISSUE No. 3: Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in 
granting the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute the action when the Appellant had engaged new counsel 
who had reactivated this litigation? The standard of review is 
whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in granting the 
Appellees' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. Country 
1 
Meadow Convalescent Center v. Utah Department of Health, 851 P.2d 
1212, 1216 (Utah App. 1993). 
ISSUE No. 4: Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in 
granting the Appellees' Motion with Prejudice. The standard of 
review is whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
granting the Appellees' Motion with Prejudice. Charlie Brown 
Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 
1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
ISSUE No. 5: Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by 
failing to hold a hearing on the Appellees' Motions to Dismiss 
when a hearing was requested by the Appellant pursuant to Rule 4-
501(3)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The 
standard of review is whether the Trial Court abused its 
discretion. Gillmor v. Cummincrs, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah App. 1991) . 
ISSUE No. 6: Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in 
interpreting Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration when it decided that Rule 4-501 did not permit the 
submission of Supplemental Memorandum which resulted in the Court 
failing to consider the Appellant's supplemental memorandum when 
deciding upon Appellees' Motions to Dismiss. The standard of 
review is to pay no deference to the legal conclusions of the 
lower court. Bettinger v. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389, 391 (Utah App. 
1990) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are reproduced in full 
and attached hereto in Appendix A: 
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Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 4-506, Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 103-3, Rules of Practice for the Federal District Court 
for the District of Utah 
Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1993) 
Section 286, California Code of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This appeal is being taken from an Order of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah, 
dated and entered on the 21st day of June, 1993, and signed by 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson, over the objections of the Appellant, 
granting the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss with prejudice for 
Failure to Prosecute. (R. 173-176 and R. 313-316). The notice of 
appeal was filed on the 3rd day of August, 1993 pursuant to Rule 
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
FACTUAL HISTORY 
1. This action was filed on June 22, 1988. (R. 1-14). 
2. The Plaintiff, as the owner of a building in Moab, Utah 
known as the Southwest Regional Center, brought action against 
the State of Utah for vacating the building prior to the 
expiration of the lease and against Defendant LaSal Oil and Rio 
Vista Oil for damages to its property occasioned by leakage of 
gasoline from underground storage tanks which were alleged to 
have created an underground plume, which invaded Plaintiff's and 
adjoining property owners land. (R. 1-14). 
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3. Appellee Rio Vista filed its answer on July 18, 1988. 
(R. 29-32) . 
4. Default Judgment was entered against Appellee La Sal on 
July 26, 1988. (R. 37). 
5. Appellee State of Utah filed a Motion for a More 
Definite Statement on August 25, 1988. (R. 41-43). 
6. The Trial Court granted Appellee State's Motion for a 
More Definite Statement on September 27, 1988. (R. 52). 
7. On November 15, 1988 Appellant's counsel William Bannon 
executed a notice of withdrawal as counsel, which was not filed 
with the Trial Court until December 8, 1988. (R. 67). 
8. On November 30, 1988, attorney Dale Gardner prepared a 
Notice of Appearance as Appellant's attorney. However, said 
Notice does not anywhere appear in the Court's record. 
9. On December 1, 1988, Counsel for Appellant prepared but 
never signed nor filed Appellant's Amended Complaint in response 
to Appellee State's Motion for a More Definite Statement. (R. 
242-254). 
10. The Plaintiff filed for protection from it's creditors 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on December 1, 1988. 
11. On December 6, 1988, Appellant and Appellee La Sal Oil 
stipulated to set aside the default judgment entered against 
Appellee La Sal. (R. 57-59). 
12. On December 7, 1988, the Trial Court issued an Order 
setting aside the Default judgment entered against Appellee La 
Sal. (R. 60-61) . 
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13. Appellee La Sal filed its answer on December 7, 1988. 
(R. 62-65) . 
14. On December 30, 198 8, Appellant's Counsel Dale Gardner 
filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel and Notice of Bankruptcy 
which informed the Trial Court that the Appellant had filed a 
petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection. (R. 69). 
15. Appellant's Bankruptcy petition was closed on October 
29, 1990. (R. 128). 
16. At no time did any of the Appellees file a Notice to 
Appoint Counsel or Appear in Person pursuant to Rule 4-506 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. (R. 219-220 and R. 175-
176) . 
17. Despite being forced into Bankruptcy by Appellees' own 
conduct, Appellant continued to pursue this litigation by 
obtaining, through the non-record discovery process, hundreds of 
relevant documents and several environmental reports. (R. 221-
239) . 
18. Despite being forced into Bankruptcy by the Appellee's 
own conduct, Appellant unsuccessfully tried to retain other 
counsel who would represent Appellant in this litigation to its 
conclusion. (R. 256-286). 
19. Appellees La Sal and Rio Vista have been involved as 
parties in collateral litigation in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah under case 
#880705660 and said case dealt with their culpability for damages 
to adjoining property owners occasioned by a gas plume which 
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invaded property abutting the Appellant's land. (R. 296-308). 
20. Appellees La Sal, Rio Vista and the State have been 
involved as parties in litigation in the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County and said case dealt with the issue of 
whether or not a gas plume from La Sal and/or Rio Vista invaded 
Appellant's and/or other neighboring properties and who should be 
responsible for costs of remediation expended by the state. (R. 
115-116) . 
21. Both of these case were concluded just prior to the 
filing of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 116). 
22. Each of the Appellees were actively involved in the 
prosecution and defense of those cases and many scientific 
studies were produced on both sides to prove issues between them. 
These studies were conducted on the Appellant's property as well 
as the property of others. (R. 116). 
23. On March 29, 1993, despite having not complied with 
Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Appellee 
State filed its Motion to For Lack of Prosecution or Strike and 
Points and Authorities. (R. 71-75). 
24. On March 31, 1993, despite having not complied with 
Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Appellee 
La Sal filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 
76-105). 
25. On April 12, 1993, Appellant's new counsel, Steven C. 
Tycksen filed his Notice of Appearance of Counsel. (R. 106). 
26. On April 12, 1993, Appellant's new counsel, Steven C. 
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Tycksen. filed a Request for Scheduling pursuant to Rule 16(b). 
(R. 108). 
27. On April 12, 1993, Appellant's new counsel, Steven C. 
Tycksen, without adequate time to evaluate the factual 
underpinnings of this complicated environmental litigation, 
prepared and submitted Objections to Defendants' Motion for 
Dismissal including a request for Oral Argument pursuant to Rule 
4-501(3)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (R. 112) 
and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities. (R. 110-125) . 
28. On April 21, 1993, Appellee La Sal submitted its Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. 
(R. 126-135). 
29. On April 21, 1993, Appellee State filed its Reply 
Regarding Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution with 
Prejudice or Strike. (R. 136-139). 
30. On May 3, 1993, Appellee Rio Vista filed a Motion for 
Joinder in Motions to Dismiss. (R. 140). 
31. On May 24, 1993, Appellant filed a Supplemental 
Affidavit in Support of its Objections to the Motions to Dismiss. 
(R. 142-146) . 
32. On June 7, 1993, Appellee La Sal filed a Notice to 
Submit for Decision. (R. 147-148). 
33. On June 7, 1993, Appellant filed a Supplemental 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition of Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. (R. 151-162). 
34. On June 8, 1993, Appellant filed a Notice to Submit for 
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Decision. (R. 149-150). 
35. On June 14, 1993, Appellee La Sal filed its Motion and 
Memorandum to Strike Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss. (R. 163-166). 
36. On June 16, 1993, Appellee State filed its Motion and 
Memorandum to Strike Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss. (R. 170-172). 
37. On June 21, 1993, Judge Lyle R. Anderson, without 
holding oral argument as requested by Appellant pursuant to Rule 
4-501(3) (b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, entered 
a minute entry ruling on the Motions to Dismiss. (R. 173-176) . 
38. A proposed Order based on the ruling was mailed to the 
Court on July 7, 1993 with an unsigned and undated mailing 
certificate. 
39. On July 15, 1993, at 4:59 p.m., Appellant via facsimile 
transmission submitted its Objection to proposed Order and a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Objections 
to the proposed Order. (R. 177-196). The court nonetheless time 
stamped the document as received July 16, 1993. (R. 177). ). 
40. On July 15, 1993, and without holding oral argument as 
requested by Appellant pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(b) of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration, Judge Lyle R. Anderson signed an 
Order of Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution with Prejudice 
submitted by Appellee State. (R. 167-169). 
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41. A hard copy of Appellant's Objections to the Proposed 
Order and Memorandum of Points and Authorities was filed with the 
Trial Court on July 16, 1993. (R. 197-312). 
42. On July 19, 1993, Judge Lyle R. Anderson entered his 
Ruling on Objections to Proposed Order through which he confirmed 
his earlier order granting Appellees' Motions to Dismiss For 
Failure to Prosecute with Prejudice. (R. 313-315). 
43. From the foregoing, Appellant filed its Notice of 
Appeal and Cost Bond. (R. 316-319). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court abused its discretion by proceeding in 
this matter despite its acknowledgement that the Appellees failed 
to comply with the terms of Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. The Trial Court abused its discretion 
by granting Appellees' Motions to Dismiss because Appellant did 
not engage in dilatory conduct worthy of such a dismissal. The 
Trial Court further abused its discretion in granting the 
Appellees' Motions to Dismiss where Appellant had engaged new 
counsel who had reactivated the case. The Trial Court abused its 
discretion by failing to hold the hearing and oral argument 
requested by the Appellant pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration. Finally, the Trial Court erred 
as a matter of law in interpreting Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
Because the Trial Court abused its discretion, and to right 
the injustice that has resulted from that abuse, this Court must 
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vacate the Trial Court's decision and remand this case to the 
Trial Court for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ACCEPTING AND 
RULING ON THE APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS WHEN THE 
APPELLEES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF 
RULE 4-506(3) OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
A. Rule 4-506 (3) 
It is axiomatic that a party must comply with the rules 
contained in the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Specifically, in the present case, Appellees filed their Motions 
to Dismiss in violation of Rule 4-506(3) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration. Further, upon filing the filing of the 
Appellees' Motions to Dismiss, the Trial Court did not require 
the Appellee's to comply with the terms of Rule 4-506(3). 
Because the Trial Court held proceedings in this case despite its 
own recognition of the Appellees' noncompliance with the Code of 
Judicial Administration (R. 175), the Trial Court abused its 
discretion. Therefore, this Court should reverse the Trial 
Court's granting of the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss. 
- Appellees violated Rule 4-506 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration. Rule 4-506(3) states 
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or 
withdraws from the case or ceases to act as an attorney, 
opposing counsel must notify, in writing, the unrepresented 
client of his responsibility to retain another attorney or 
appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate 
further proceedings against the client. A copy of the 
written notice shall be filed with the court and no further 
proceedings shall be held in the matter until 2 0 days have 
elapsed from the date of filing. 
Rule 4-506(3), Code of Judicial Administration (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the rule contains a mandatory proscription against any 
further proceedings in an action until twenty days have elapsed 
following the date of filing the notice to obtain counsel or 
appear. The express language of the Rule precludes any exercise 
of discretion by the Trial Court with respect to whether a party 
must comply with the terms of the Rule. 
Appellees violated Rule 4-506(3) by failing to serve 
Appellant with notice to obtain counsel or appear. The Trial 
Court abused its discretion by granting Appellees' Motion to 
Dismiss in light of their respective violations of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. In Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the question of whether a 
trial court abused its discretion in granting a party's Motion 
for Summary Judgment when the moving party failed to comply with 
the predecessor to Rule 4-506. In Sperry, the court said, 
Since the judgment was entered after the failure of the 
court to follow one of its own rules, we conclude that the 
trial court abused its discretion. 
Sperry at 582. The present case is analogous to Sperry. In 
Sperry, the attorney did not comply with the predecessor to Rule 
4-506 (no Notice to Appear in Person or Obtain Counsel was mailed 
to the other party). As in Sperry, in the present case, counsel 
for the Appellees did not send notification to the Appellant of 
the need to obtain counsel or appear. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion because it clearly 
found that the Appellees failed to comply with Rule 4-506(3), yet 
nonetheless accepted and ruled on Appellees Motion to Dismiss. 
11 
In its Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, this Court expressly 
stated that the Appellees failed to comply with the rule when 
counsel for Hartford Leasing withdrew from the case. (R. 175-
176). Yet in spite of this admission of noncompliance, the Judge 
Lyle R. Anderson granted Appellees' Motion to Dismiss. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion because it erroneously 
created its own remedy for noncompliance with Rule 4-506 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. In its ruling, the Trial 
Court stated that "the remedy for such a failure is not 
necessarily denial of the motion. The remedy is to grant 
Hartford sufficient time after a pleading is filed in violation 
of Rule 4-506 to obtain counsel and adequately respond. It is 
evident here that Hartford has had that opportunity." (R. 175-
176). The Trial Court's ruling is an abuse of discretion because 
it both ignores the plain language of the Rule and creates its 
own remedy which does not follow the precedent established in 
Utah and other jurisdictions. 
The Trial Court's ruling on this matter is an abuse of 
discretion because it ignores the express language of the Rule 
which precludes the filing of any further proceedings against the 
party until such time as the notice is provided. Rule 4-506 does 
not vest the Trial Court with the discretion to permit 
proceedings despite noncompliance with the rule. In Sperrv, 
supra, the Trial Court accepted a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
heard the matter and granted the Motion despite noncompliance 
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with the then existing version of Rule 4-506.x Sperry at 583. 
In Sperry, the Utah Supreme Court said, "Since the judgment was 
entered after the failure of the court to follow one of its own 
rules, we conclude that the Trial Court abused its discretion." 
Sperry at 583. This is precisely what occurred in the present 
case. The Trial Court accepted and ruled upon Appellees' Motions 
to Dismiss despite its express admission that Appellees failed to 
comply with Rule 4-506. (R. 175-176). Thus, the Trial Court 
abused its discretion. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion in creating its own 
remedy which both ignored the express language of the rule and 
precedent. The Trial Court stated 
the remedy for such a failure is not necessarily denial of 
the motion. The remedy is to grant Hartford sufficient time 
after a pleading is filed in violation of Rule 4-506 to 
obtain counsel and adequately respond. It is evident here 
that Hartford has had that opportunity. 
(R. 175-176). The Trial Court's statement is an abuse of 
discretion. First, as mentioned above, the rule expressly states 
that no further proceedings shall be held until twenty days after 
the required notice has been given. See Rule 4-506, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration (1993). Thus, the Trial Court abused its 
discretion in holding proceedings before such notice was filed. 
1
 Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts of 
the State of Utah, in the relevant part, stated, "When an attorney 
dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from the case or 
ceases to act as an attorney, the party to an action for whom such 
attorney was acting, must before any further proceedings as had 
against him, be required by the adverse party, by written notice to 
appoint another or to appear in person." Rule 2.5 of the Rules of 
Practice of the District Courts of the State of Utah as quoted in 
Sperry at 582. 
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Second, the appropriate remedy is expressly set forth in the Rule 
itself, i.e.; to not hold any further proceedings until 
compliance with the rule is satisfied. In Sperrv, the Utah 
Supreme Court said, "the trial judge should have required 
plaintiff's attorney to then give notice . . . in accordance with 
Rule 2.5 before proceeding to hear and grant the motion." Sperrv 
at 582. 
Utah is not alone in its interpretation that the appropriate 
remedy for failure to comply with such Rules is to require the 
noncomplying party to comply prior to holding any further 
proceedings. California, in its Code of Civil Procedure, has a 
provision which is similar to Utah"s 4-506.2 In McMunn v. 
Lehrke, 155 P. 473, 476 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 1915), the court held 
that where the court set a matter for trial and held the trial in 
the absence of the adverse party providing notice to the 
unrepresented party, the court was without the authority to hold 
a trial in this matter. In McMunn, the court stated, "It seems 
to us that the court was without the authority to proceed with 
the trial. We are further of the opinion that, if it was within 
the discretion of the court so to proceed, it was, under all the 
circumstances, an abuse of discretion." McMunn at 477. 
In Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co., 170 Cal. App. 
2
 Section 286, C.C.P. states, "When an attorney dies, or is 
removed or suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party to an 
action, for whom he was acting as attorney, must, before any 
further proceedings are had against him, be required by the adverse 
party, by written notice, to appoint another attorney, or to appear 
in person." 
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3d 725, 216 Cal. Rptr. 300, (Cal App. 2 Dist. 1985) the 
California courts again addressed the question of whether it was 
an abuse of discretion to hold proceedings in the face of 
noncompliance with C.C.P. §286. In Aldrich, the court said 
Section 286 means what it plainly says, 'that no proceedings 
may be had against him [the now unrepresented party] no 
judgment or order or other step in the action taken, until 
he appoints an attorney, unless the prescribed notice be 
first given.' [citing to Larking v. Superior Court, 171 
Cal. 719, 154 P. 841 (1916)]. The term *proceedings', used 
in its technical legal sense, refers to something done or to 
be done in a court of justice or before a judicial officer, 
[citing to Lister v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 3d 64, 70, 
159 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1979)]. A motion in the superior court 
to dismiss an action for want of prosecution is a good 
illustration of what is meant by the term proceeding. 
Aldrich at 310 [emphasis supplied]. In both McMunn and Aldrich, 
the appellate courts vacated the judgments and remanded the case 
back to the trial courts for further proceedings. Thus, the 
California courts make it clear that a Motion to Dismiss is a 
proceeding included under the scope of a statute similar to 
Utah's 4-506 and that it is an abuse of discretion for the Trial 
Court to hold such proceedings in the absence of the required 
notice. Similarly, this Court should vacate the judgment granted 
by the Trial Court because the Trial Court abused its discretion. 
B. Gardiner's Notice of Withdrawal 
Appellees' raised arguments to the Trial Court, with which 
the Trial Court apparently agreed, stating that Appellant's 
previous attorney's Notice for Withdrawal relieved Appellees of 
their burden to comply with Rule 4-506(3) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration. (R. 127). As the language of Rule 4-506 makes 
clear, compliance with the rule is mandatory. There was never an 
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appearance in this case by any other counsel for or on behalf of 
Appellant until its current counsel filed a Notice of Appearance 
in April of 1993. (R. 115). Clearly, the Appellees were not in 
any way relieved of their burden to comply with this rule. Thus, 
the Trial Court abused its discretion in both accepting and 
granting Appellees' Motion to Dismiss. 
Appellees failure to comply with Rule 4-506(3) was both in 
violation of the Code of Judicial Administration and 
unreasonable. The Trial Court erroneously excused the Appellees 
from the requirements of Rule 4-506(3) of the Code of Judicial 
Administration because the Notice of Withdrawal was allegedly 
ambiguous. (R. 175). However, upon a careful review of the 
notice (R. 69), it is apparent that the notice did not contain 
any information which would relieve the Defendants' of their 
burden to comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 4-506. 
Specifically, the Withdrawal of Counsel and Notice of 
Bankruptcy contains two paragraphs. The first paragraph clearly 
states that Dale F. Gardiner was withdrawing as counsel in the 
present case. The second paragraph states 
NOTICE is also given that on December 1, 1988, Hartford 
Leasing Corporation filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition 
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Utah. Counsel for Hartford Leasing Corporation is George H. 
Speciale Esq., 5 Triad Center #585, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84180. 
See Exhibit 1. Clearly, the fact that naming Mr. Speciale as 
counsel for Hartford Leasing is contained in the same paragraph 
which informs the defendants of Hartford Leasing's filing a 
petition for bankruptcy indicates that Mr. Speciale was counsel 
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for Hartford Leasing in the bankruptcy proceeding. The World 
Book Encyclopedia, defines "paragraph" as "a division of written 
work, consisting of one or more sentences, all related to the 
same idea." World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 13, Field Enterprises, 
Inc. (1957).3 
The Notice of Withdrawal contains two separate paragraphs 
which clearly relate to two separate subject matters. Paragraph 
one simply informs the parties of Mr. Gardner's withdrawal as 
counsel for the Appellant. Paragraph two contains two sentences 
both of which related to Appellant's filing bankruptcy. Had the 
notice intended to convey that Mr. Speciale was counsel for the 
Appellant in the present matter, the reference to him would have 
obviously been placed in the first paragraph. Any other reading 
of this notice is both twisted and plainly erroneous. 
Mr. Speciale never filed a notice of appearance in this case 
with this court. While the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
contain a rule which expressly requires a Notice of Appearance4 
3
 See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, defining paragraph 
as "a subdivision of a written composition that consists of one or 
more sentences, deals with one point or gives the words of one 
speaker and begins on a new usually line. See also The Harbrace 
College Handbook, Chapter 32, stating, "An essential unit of 
thought in writing, the paragraph usually consists of a group of 
related sentences . . . . In a unified paragraph, each sentence 
contributes to developing a central idea." The Harbrace College 
Handbook, Chapter 32, pp. 311-313, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Publishers, 1986 and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 6th Edition (defining 
paragraph as a distinct part of a discourse or writing; any section 
or subdivision of writing or chapter which relates to particularly 
points, whether consisting of one or many sentences). 
4
 Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in the 
relevant part, states, "Every pleading and other paper filed with 
the court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and 
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be filed, it is the understood practice of attorneys to file such 
Notices in cases where the attorney has replaced withdrawn 
counsel or to appeal generally in court or by filing a pleading. 
None of those things were ever done by Mr. Speciale in the State 
Court. 
Further, while the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
contain an express rule requiring a Notice of Appearance, the 
Federal Rules of Practice of the United States District Court do 
contain such a rule. Rule 103-3 (a) of the Rule of Practice for 
the Federal District Court, in the relevant part, states 
If an attorney's appearance has not been established 
previously by the filing of papers in the action or 
proceeding, such attorney shall file with the clerk a 
notice of appearance promptly upon undertaking the 
representation of any party or witness in any court or 
grand jury proceeding. 
Rule 103-3 (a), Rules of Practice for the Federal District Court 
(1992) . Thus, while the Rules of Practice are not binding on the 
State District courts, they do codify what has become the 
standard industry practice for attorneys who take over 
representation of a client after the withdrawal of previous 
counsel. 
Appellees' failure to comply with Rule 4-506(3) of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration was not reasonable nor should it 
bar number of any attorney representing the party filing the paper, 
which information shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the 
first page." Rule 10, U.R.C.P. (1992). It should be noted that 
many of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are copied exactly or 
patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 10, 
U.R.C.P. is similar to Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See Compiler's Note following Rule 10, U.R.C.P. 
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be excused. The Trial Court's decision to excuse noncompliance 
with this Rule effectively stated that the withdrawing counsel 
has the right to name any other attorney as a replacement 
(whether the same is true or not) and opposing parties are then 
excused from the requirements of the Rule. Such an 
interpretation is strictly contrary to the very purpose for which 
the Rule was enacted, protecting unrepresented parties from the 
harsh results which can occur as a result of that lack of 
representation. Withdrawing counsel is not and should not be 
vested with the authority to notify the court of replacement 
counsel. Further, nothing short of a notice of appearance from 
replacement counsel relieves the Defendants' from their 
affirmative duty to file with the Court and serve the Appellant 
with a Notice to Obtain Counsel or Appear as required by Rule 4-
506 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Because the Appellees failed to comply with the provisions 
of Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and 
because the Trial Court held proceedings in this matter despite 
that noncompliance, the Trial Court abused its discretion. 
Therefore this Court must vacate the decision of the Trial Court 
and remand this case to the Trial Court for further proceedings. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED 
APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Appellees' 
Motion to Dismiss because the factors which that court must 
consider favor denying Appellees' motion. In Maxfield v. 
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1989), this Court stated 
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There is more to consider in determining if dismissal for 
failure to prosecute is proper than merely the amount of 
time elapsed since the suit was filed. The factors which we 
consider include the following: (1) the conduct of both 
parties; (2) the opportunity which each party has had to 
move the case forward; (3) what each party has done to move 
the case forward; (4) what difficulty or prejudice may have 
been caused to the other side; and (5) most important, 
whether injustice may result from the dismissal. 
Maxfield at 239, citing K.L.C., Inc. v. McLean, 656 P.2d 986, 988 
(Utah 1982) . 
L, THE CONDUCT OF BOTH PARTIES. 
The first factor, the conduct of both parties, after 
considering the record and informal discovery by the Appellant, 
weighs heavily to conclude that the only party who has made any 
effort to bring this case to fruition is the Appellant. On the 
record alone, the Appellant filed a complaint in June of 1988. 
(R. 1-15) . The Appellees responded the shortly thereafter. (R. 
29-33; 41-42; and 62-65). Nothing more of substance appears on 
the record. Thus, on the record, both parties pursued or appear 
to be dilatory in this action with equal vigor. However, does 
not reflect all of the activity on the case. 
Dismissal with prejudice was inappropriate in this case. In 
its ruling of June 21, 1993, the Trial Court stated that "between 
December 30, 1988 and March 29, 1993, Hartford has done nothing 
to move this case forward." (R. 174). If that were in fact the 
case, then perhaps dismissal with prejudice would be justified in 
this case. Admittedly, the docket report for this case reflects 
a complete lack of activity to prosecute or defend this case by 
any party. (R. 217-220). In fact, there are not entries on the 
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docket at all from June 22, 1988 to March 29, 1993. (R. 219-
220). However, the record does not accurately reflect the 
activities of any of the parties in either prosecuting or 
defending this action. 
Appellant has diligently prosecuted this case from the date 
the case was filed to the present. The factual basis for 
Appellant's claims against Appellees Rio Vista and La Sal were 
the basis of numerous studies by governmental agencies 
surrounding an environmental waste discharge. Appellant 
diligently pursued this action through vigorously pursuing non-
non-record discovery from governmental agencies and private 
entities who were not parties to this litigation. (R. 221-239) . 
From the date of filing the Complaint through the end of 
November 1988, Plaintiff's counsel Dale Gardiner actively pursued 
this litigation through record discovery (responding to 
interrogatories and attending depositions) and non-record 
discovery (seeking information about the source of the injuries 
suffered by Hartford Leasing from persons and entities who were 
not parties to this litigation). 
Dale Gardiner filed a notice of withdrawal as counsel and 
Notice of Bankruptcy on December 26, 1988. (R. 69). However, 
prior to that date, and in response to this Court granting 
Defendant State of Utah's Motion for a More Definite Statement, 
Gardiner drafted an Amended Complaint. (R. 242-255). 
Unbeknownst to the Appellant and for reasons that Appellant can 
only speculate as to, Gardiner failed to file the Amended 
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Complaint or otherwise notify Appellant that he had failed to do 
so. 
Appellant continued to actively pursue the case from 
December of 1988 through October of 1990. During this period of 
time, Appellant was under the protection of the bankruptcy court 
because it filed a petition for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
as a result of the economic stress which occurred to it as a 
result of the Appellee State of Utah vacating the building and 
also as a result of the gas plume which occurred due to leaking 
underground storage tanks allegedly owned by the other Appellees 
to this action who were abutting property owners. (R. 69). In 
October of 1990, Appellant's bankruptcy petition was dismissed. 
(R. 128). From December 1988 through October 1990, even if 
Appellant had done nothing to prosecute this action, such failure 
to prosecute would be protected under the United States 
Bankruptcy code. 
However, despite their pending bankruptcy, Appellant 
continued to exercise diligence in prosecuting this case. 
Admittedly, most of the discovery activity which occurred during 
this period of time was non-record discovery (such as obtaining 
environmental reports from various governmental agencies or 
private entities which evaluated the area to identify the source 
of the gas plume which devaluated Appellant's building and 
resulted in the State of Utah vacating the premises). (R. 221-
239). The mere fact that Appellant's activities were neither on 
the record (as are notices of deposition, for example) nor 
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directly involving an Appellee, does not mean that Appellant did 
nothing to prosecute this case. Appellant diligently 
prosecuted this case by engaging in settlement negotiations. 
Appellant was actively negotiating a settlement of this case with 
the State of Utah during the period of time from June 1989 
through December 1990. (R. 236). Most courts which have 
considered the question have held that it is improper to dismiss 
with prejudice a case for failure to prosecute where the parties 
have actively engaged in settlement negotiations. See e.g. Utah 
Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1977) and Hazen v. 
Williams, 30 So.2d 522 (Fla 1947). Thus, under the better 
reasoned decisions, apparent delays in prosecuting a claim is not 
grounds for dismissal with prejudice where the delays resulted in 
significant part from settlement negotiations. Therefore, 
Appellant should be deemed to have actively and diligently 
pursued this case up to December 1990. 
Appellant diligently prosecuted this case from December of 
1990 to the present. Appellant retained counsel, actively 
communicated with them and waited for retained counsel to 
prosecute the case. (R. 256-286). Each time, the counsel 
retained would either develop a conflict of interest which 
precluded them from handling the complete case or would cease to 
work on the matter once they realized that Appellant could not 
pay the required hourly rate. (R. 256-286). 
In late December of 1992, Appellant consulted with present 
counsel about the possibility of taking this case on a 
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contingency. Present counsel advised Appellant that after 
reviewing the documents, if he felt that Appellant had a case, he 
would accept the matter on a contingency fee basis. In early 
1993, Appellant entered into a contingency fee agreement with 
their present counsel. (R. 284-286). Thus, Appellant continued 
to diligently pursue this action from the date it was initially 
filed. 
2. THE OPPORTUNITY EACH PARTY HAS HAD TO MOVE THE CASE 
FORWARD. 
The second factor, the opportunity each party has had to 
move the case forward favors the Appellant because the Appellant 
has had less opportunity to move this case forward than have the 
Appellees. In December of 1988, Counsel for Appellant filed a 
Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel and Notice of Bankruptcy. (R. 
69). Appellant filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. (R. 
69). Appellant was financially devastated as a direct result of 
the injustices complained of in their complaint. The property in 
question experienced a gross devaluation, the tenants having 
vacated caused Plaintiff's cash flow to dry up, and the Appellant 
was materially threatened in its ability to survive let alone 
prosecute this action. During the pendency of that Bankruptcy 
action, Appellant was unrepresented in this case as a matter of 
the record. Appellant required time to regroup and reorganize 
its affairs so as to be able to properly prosecute its interests. 
As a result of these difficulties, Appellant had little record 
opportunity to move this case forward. Nonetheless, and despite 
its severe economic difficulties arising proximately from the 
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Appellees' conduct, the Appellant has diligently pursued informal 
discovery which is not reflected on the Court's docket and has 
repeatedly retained counsel who have stayed on the case just long 
enough to spend their retainer fees before discovering a 
previously unknown conflict of interest. In this case, Appellant 
has done everything within its power to diligently prosecute this 
case. It has executed every practical opportunity afforded to it 
to do so. 
In contrast to Appellant's circumstances and efforts, 
Appellees' remained represented by counsel. Appellees' offered 
no debilitating financial starts and had every opportunity to 
continue to move this case forward and failed to avail themselves 
of any of those opportunities. Consequently, the second factor, 
the opportunity each party had to move the case forward, favors 
ruling against the Appellees' Motion to Dismiss. 
3^ WHAT EACH PARTY HAS DONE TO MOVE THIS CASE FORWARD. 
The third factor, what each party has actually done to move 
this case forward, favors ruling against Appellees' on their 
Motion to Dismiss. Appellant was unrepresented by counsel, as a 
matter of record, in this action from December 1988 until April 
7, 1993 when Appellant's new counsel filed a Notice of 
Appearance. (R. 69 and 106). Appellant's delay in obtaining new 
counsel to appear in the case related both to their bankruptcy 
petition and the inability to retain counsel who would carry this 
case to fruition in light of the Appellant's limited ability to 
pay counsel's hourly fees. (R. 256-286). However, Plaintiff did 
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continue consistency to gather discovery information and to 
pursue obtaining counsel. A summary of the activities in 
chronological order is set forth in the record. 
When Appellant obtained new counsel in this matter, Counsel 
for Appellant immediately filed with the Trial Court a Request 
for Scheduling Order. (R. 108). Thus, as soon as Appellant 
obtained new counsel who would carry this case to fruition based 
on a contingency fee agreement, Appellant took steps to move this 
case to a resolution. 
In contrast to Appellant's excusable inability to move this 
case forward, Appellees' have no excuse. Appellees' failed to 
move this case forward by filing the requisite Notice to Obtain 
Counsel or Appear as required by Rule 4-506 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. (R. 175). Further, Appellees' did 
nothing to further this litigation other than take two 
depositions and subpoena records held by one of the other 
Appellees. (R. 25-28; 38-39; 44-46; and 47-51). Despite being 
constantly represented by the same counsel throughout the period 
of this litigation, Appellees never filed a certificate of 
readiness for trial, did not request a scheduling order or move 
to challenge the cause of action on the merits in summary 
proceedings, nor did they do anything else to move this 
litigation forward. Thus, on balance, this factor favors the 
Appellant and this court should rule that the trial court abused 
its discretion in granting Appellees' Motion to Dismiss. 
4. WHAT DIFFICULTY OR PREJUDICE MAY HAVE OCCURRED TO THE 
OTHER SIDE. 
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The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Appellees' 
Motions to Dismiss because Appellees have suffered no difficulty 
or prejudice as a result of the alleged delays in this 
litigation. The Trial Court's Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss 
states 
The Defendants claim that they have suffered prejudice 
because the passage of time has affected their ability to 
gather evidence for the defense. The Court discounts some 
of those claims because most of the Defendants have had the 
opportunity and the incentive to gather much of the same 
evidence in related matters. However, the Court recognizes 
that witnesses become less available as time passes and that 
some tests, particularly on carpeting, cannot be performed 
now that the carpeting has been replaced. 
(R. 175). The Trial Court's statement is an abuse of discretion 
because the Appellees have not been prejudiced in this matter. 
As noted above, Appellant has not delayed in bringing this 
action to fruition. Appellees have been actively involved in 
litigation which is substantially similar to this litigation. 
(R. 129; 296-304; and 305-308). Both of these pieces of 
litigation centered around the very same underground gas plume 
leak which is the subject of this litigation. All of the 
litigation referred to herein has involved the issue of whether 
or not there was a gas plume in the vicinity of the Moab Regional 
Center, and whether it originated with La Sal Oil and/or Rio 
Vista Oil facilities. Extensive testing of the neighboring 
properties as well as the Appellant's property in the Moab 
Regional Center was done during these litigation efforts. In the 
related litigation, the Appellees were motivated to prove their 
respective innocence by performing extensive expensive scientific 
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studies which thereby preserved the factual record necessary to 
defend themselves in this case. In fact, as late as May 6, 1992, 
Appellee La Sal and Rio Vista designated their respective expert 
witnesses in these other cases. Thus, contrary to the Trial 
Court's statements, Appellees had no trouble obtaining witnesses 
in 1992 and will not have trouble obtaining the same witnesses 
now. Appellee LaSal and Rio Vista's claims of prejudice are 
without merit. 
Appellee, State of Utah, will not be prejudiced insofar as 
they were a party to one of the proceedings in which LaSal was 
engaged. The State held exhaustive administrative proceedings 
against both Rio Vista and La Sal during which that Appellee 
attempted to apportion liability for environmental clean up of 
the Moab property damaged by Appellees La Sal and Rio Vista. 
Appellant's claim against Appellee State is for breach of 
contract. The claim amounts to a statement that if the property 
was not environmentally damaged, then the State is liable for 
breach of their lease with Appellant. If however, the property 
is environmentally damaged, and the damage rendered the building 
uninhabitable, the State is not liable for vacating the leased 
premises prior to the expiration of the lease. The majority of 
the State's defense is documentary in nature. Further, in 
determining whether the building was environmentally damaged, 
Appellee State has access to reports and studies performed by the 
Department of Environmental Quality, EPA, OSHA and a multitude of 
private consulting contractors who have investigated the site. 
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Therefore, Appellee State has in no way been prejudiced by the 
alleged delays in bringing this case to trial. 
Further, the Trial Court abused its discretion by 
determining without any evidence at all, that necessary tests on 
the carpet could no longer be performed because the carpet had 
been removed from the building. The fact is that not one of the 
Appellees' has requested access to the carpet to perform such 
tests. Appellant has had and still has the original carpet that 
was removed from the building. (R. 288-289). The alleged 
prejudice that the Appellees' would suffer could easily be 
eliminated if merely one of the Appellees' had requested the 
Appellant produce the carpet for testing. Thus, the Trial Court 
abused its discretion in assuming the existence of facts, which 
not only were not in the record but were and are wholly untrue. 
While none of the Appellees has in fact been prejudiced, the 
action of the Trial Court was an abuse of discretion because it 
constitutes the ultimate in prejudice to the Appellant who had a 
justifiable excuse for the alleged delays in bringing this case 
to trial. As stated in Jepson v. New, 792 P.2d 728, 735 (Ariz 
1990), "there can hardly be any prejudice than the complete loss 
of a cause of action." Thus, while the prejudice to the 
Appellees' is at most minimal and in fact nonexistent, Appellant 
has now endured the greatest possible prejudice. Thus, balancing 
the equities, the Trial Court abused its discretion in granting 
Appellees' Motions to Dismiss. 
5. WHETHER INJUSTICE MAY RESULT FROM DISMISSAL. 
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This final factor, considered to be the most important 
factor, heavily favors the Appellant. The Appellant has suffered 
severe economic injuries as a result of the conduct of the 
Appellees. In fact, Appellant was forced to file bankruptcy as a 
direct result of the injuries alleged against the Appellees. It 
would be grossly unjust to permit the alleged wrongdoers to 
escape the possible consequences of their actions merely because 
their actions were severe enough to economically ruin the 
Appellant thereby financially precluding it from prosecuting this 
case zealously on the record. In order to right an extreme and 
grave injustice, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
granting of Appellees' Motion to Dismiss. 
Appellant is entitled to its day in court. In Westinqhouse 
Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 
P.2d 876 (Utah 1975), the court said, "It is indeed commendable 
to handle cases with dispatch and to move calendars forward with 
expedition in order to keep them up to date. But it is even more 
important to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence 
of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and 
to do justice to them." Westinqhouse at 878 [emphasis added]. 
As in Westinqhouse, this Court should recognize that the 
Appellant has a right to be heard. The Trial Court's decision 
did handle this case with dispatch and thereby move its calendar 
forward, but it did so by foreclosing a cause of action that the 
Appellants have quietly and diligently pursued. The Trial 
Court's decision resulted in the ultimate injustice, denying the 
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Appellant its day in court. Further, the Trial Court's decision 
came without any prior warning to the Appellant. The Trial Court 
did not issue an Order to Show Cause or in any other way warn the 
Appellant that its allegedly dilatory conduct would result in 
dismissal of this action. Thus, this Court should vacate the 
Trial Court's granting of Appellees' Motion to Dismiss which 
thereby precluded Appellant from having their day in court 
because the Trial Court abused its discretion in so ruling. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE 
APPELLEES' MOTIONS TO DISMISS WHERE THE APPELLANT HAD 
OBTAINED NEW COUNSEL WHO HAD REACTIVATED THIS CASE. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Appellees' 
Motions to Dismiss with Prejudice for Failure to Prosecute this 
action where the Appellant had obtained new counsel who obviously 
had reactivated this case. Because the Trial Court abused its 
discretion, this Court must vacate the Trial Court's decision and 
remand this case back to the Trial Court for further proceedings. 
Utah case law is clear that it is an abuse of discretion to 
grant a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to prosecute where the 
party has obtained new counsel who has reactivated the case. In 
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368, (Utah 1977), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered a case wherein there was almost four 
years of inactivity on the part of both the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant. In Johnson, the Plaintiff's inactive counsel withdrew 
and new counsel made an appearance immediately prior to the trial 
court's granting the Defendant's Motions to Dismiss for Failure 
to Prosecute. In Johnson, the Utah Supreme Court said 
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The conduct of all of the parties cannot be readily 
explained; and in view of the fact that new counsel caused 
the case to be activated, it seems that the trial court 
abused its discretion in dismissing the case on a motion to 
dismiss . . . . 
Johnson at 1370. 
Johnson is still the law in Utah. As recently as April of 
1993, in Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Utah Department 
of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1216 (Utah App. 1993), this Court cited 
favorably to Johnson as standing for the proposition that it is 
an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to grant a Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute where new counsel had been 
obtained and had reactivated the case. Country Meadows at 1216. 
In the present case, the Trial Court abused its discretion 
by granting Appellees' Motions to Dismiss for Failure to 
Prosecute in light of the fact that Appellant had obtained new 
counsel who had reactivated the case. Appellant was without 
counsel of record from December 1988 through April of 1993. (R. 
69 and 106). On April 16, 1993, when Appellant's new counsel 
made his appearance on the record, Appellant's new counsel also 
filed a Request for a Scheduling Conference. (R. 108). Clearly, 
Appellant's new counsel was reactivating the case. Thus, the 
Trial Court abused its discretion in granting Appellees' Motions 
to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute in light of the efforts of 
Appellant's new counsel to reactivate this case. Therefore, this 
Court must vacate the Trial Court's decision and remand this case 
for further proceedings in the Trial Court. 
IV, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE 
APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE WITH 
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PREJUDICE. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion by granting Appellees' 
Motions to Dismiss with Prejudice. Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure in the relevant part, states 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or 
for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P. (1993). Thus, this Rule implies that the 
Trial Court has the discretion to dismiss an action without 
prejudice. 
Utah case law recognizes that a dismissal with prejudice is 
a severe sanction that should only be imposed where a party 
neglects to prosecute an action without justifiable excuse. 
Country Meadows Convalescent Center v. Utah Department of Health, 
851 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Utah App. 1993). In the present case, the 
Appellant had a number of justifiable excuses for the record not 
reflecting the activity in which it had engaged to bring this 
action to trial. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion in granting the 
Appellees' Motions to Dismiss because it had lesser sanctions 
available to it would have more fairly punished the Appellant for 
the alleged delay in bringing this action to trial. In Tolman v. 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah App. 1991), 
this Court defined an abuse of discretion as 
By an as of discretion is meant a clearly erroneous 
conclusion and judgment . . . It is a legal term to indicate 
that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was a 
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commission of error of law in the circumstances. It is an 
improvident exercise of discretion. 
Tolman at 26-27. 
In the present case, the Trial Court improvidently exercised 
its discretion by granting the Appellees' Motions to Dismiss with 
Prejudice. The Trial Court had lesser sanctions available to it 
which would have permitted the Appellant its day in court while 
at the same time punishing it for its allegedly dilatory conduct. 
The Trial Court could have made the Appellant pay the costs and 
fees the Appellees' incurred in filing their Motions to Dismiss. 
The Trial Court could have set a scheduling order and trial 
designed to promptly resolve the matter. Finally, the Trial 
Court could have dismissed the action without prejudice. Because 
the Trial Court never warned the Appellant that its conduct might 
lead to dismissal and the Appellant had a justifiable excuse for 
the alleged delay in prosecuting this action, the Trial Court 
could have and should have imposed a lessor sanction than 
dismissal with prejudice upon the Appellant. Therefore, the 
Trial Court abused its discretion in granting the Appellees' 
Motions to Dismiss with Prejudice. Therefore, this Court must 
vacate the Trial Court's decision and remand this case to the 
Trial Court for further proceedings. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO HOLD A 
HEARING PRIOR TO DECIDING APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS WHEN 
THE APPELLANT REQUESTED SUCH A HEARING PURSUANT TO RULE 4-
501(3) (b) OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion by granting Appellees' 
Motions to Dismiss without holding a hearing and oral argument as 
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requested by Hartford Leasing pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(b) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Thus, this Court must 
vacate the Trial Court's decision and remand this case to the 
Trial Court for further proceedings. 
Rule 4-501(3)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration 
states 
In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the 
action or any issues in the action on the merits with 
prejudice, either party at the time of filing principal 
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may 
file a written request for a hearing 
4-501(3) (b), U.C.A. (1993). Appellant requested oral argument 
its Objections to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. (R. 112). 
The Trial Court was required to grant a request for a 
hearing on the matter unless two narrow exceptions were present. 
Rule 4-501(3)(c) states 
Such a request shall be granted unless the court finds that 
(a) the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous 
or (b) that the dispositive issues governing the 
granting or denial of the motion has been 
authoritatively decided. 
Rule 4-501(3) (c), U.C.A. (1993). Thus, the Trial Court was 
mandated either to grant the hearing or alternatively make 
findings that the hearing was not necessary because the motion is 
frivolous or that dispositive issues have been authoritatively 
decided. 
In the present case, the Trial Court did not grant the 
hearing. Additionally, the Trial Court did not make findings 
that the hearing was denied because of frivolity of the motion or 
that the dispositive issues had been authoritatively decided. 
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The Trial Court's rationale for not granting the Appellant's 
hearing was expressed in the Trial Court's Ruling on Objections 
to Proposed Order wherein it said 
It is true that plaintiff requested oral argument when its 
filed its original memorandum in opposition to the motion to 
dismiss. Under Rule 4-501, plaintiff would have been 
entitled to oral argument. However, plaintiff thereafter 
filed a Notice to Submit for Decision that reads in full as 
follows: 
Plaintiff's objection to Defendants' Motion for 
Dismissal filed with the Court on or near the 7th day 
of April, 1993, by Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney for 
Plaintiff, is now at issue and ready for decision of 
the Court. 
The natural interpretation of this notice that nothing 
remained to be done before the court rendered a decision, 
and that plaintiff had waived its right to oral argument. 
The Court accordingly ruled without oral argument. 
(R. 313 and 314). Such rationale is not among the grounds for 
denying a requested hearing. Thus, the Trial Court abused its 
discretion in granting Appellees' Motions to Dismiss without 
holding the requested hearing. 
The Trial Court did not provide Appellant with notice of 
whether the hearing was denied or granted. Rule 4-501(3) (d) 
states 
when a request for a hearing is denied, the court shall 
notify the requesting party. When a request for a hearing 
is granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or 
notify the requesting party that the matter shall be heard 
and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
Rule 4-501(3) (d), U.C.A. (1993). In the present case, the Trial 
Court never notified Appellant that its request for a hearing was 
denied. Additionally, the Trial Court did not notify Appellant 
that the matter would be heard. Consequently, the trial court 
failed to follow the very rules which govern judicial 
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administration in the State of Utah. Clearly, failure to follow 
these rules is an abuse of discretion. Therefore, Appellant 
requests this Court to vacate the Trial Court's grant of 
Appellees' Motion to Dismiss and remand this case back to the 
trial court for further proceedings. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN INTERPRETING 
RULE 4-501 OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION BY 
FAILING TO CONSIDER APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES WHICH APPELLANT SUBMITTED PRIOR TO 
THE COURT RULING OF APPELLEES' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE 
TO PROSECUTE. 
The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in its 
interpretation of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. Specifically, the Trial Court erred when it 
ruled that Rule 4-501 precludes a party from submitting 
supplemental memoranda in reply to a Motion to Dismiss. (R. 
173). Because the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of Rule 
4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, this Court 
must reverse the Trial Court's grant of Appellees' Motions for 
Summary Judgment and remand this case to the trial court for 
further proceedings. 
There is nothing in Rule 4-501 which precludes filing 
supplemental memoranda. In fact, the plain language of the rule 
expressly provides for the filing of supplemental memoranda. 
Rule 4-501(1) (a), in the relevant part states, "All motions . . 
. shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and 
authorities." Thus, the Rule initially sets out a minimum 
requirement of at least one memorandum of points and authorities. 
Rule 4-501(1) (a) then goes on to expressly contemplate the 
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filing of more than one memorandum of points and authorities 
along with a single motion, "Memoranda supporting or opposing a 
motion shall not exceed ten pages in length . . . " Rule 4-
501(1) (a), U.C.A. (1993). This sentence expressly uses the 
plural of Memorandum while referring to a single motion. Thus, 
the plain language of this section of the rule permits filing 
more than one memoranda supporting or opposing a motion to 
dismiss. 
Appellant asserts that this reading of the statute is 
bolstered by the language used in other subsections of this rule. 
For instance, Rule 4-501(3) (b) states, 
In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the 
action . . . either party at the time of filing the 
principal motion in support or in opposition to a motion may 
file a written request for a hearing. 
Rule 4-501(3) (b), U.C.A. (1993). Thus, the rule seems to 
expressly contemplate that more than one memoranda may accompany 
a single motion. Additionally, there is clearly nothing in Rule 
4-501 which precludes filing more than one memorandum in support 
or opposition of a motion. Therefore, the Trial Court erred as a 
matter of law when it interpreted Rule 4-501 as precluding the 
filing of supplemental memorandum and therefore did not consider 
Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum in ruling on Appellees' 
Motions to Dismiss. Because the Trial Court erred as a matter of 
law, this Court must reverse the Trial Court and remand this case 
back for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court abused its discretion by proceeding in this 
38 
matter despite its acknowledgement that the Appellees failed to 
comply with the terms of Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. The Trial Court abused its discretion by 
granting Appellees' Motions to Dismiss because Appellant did not 
engage in dilatory conduct worthy of such a dismissal. The Trial 
Court further abused its discretion in granting the Appellees' 
Motions to Dismiss where Appellant had engaged new counsel who 
had reactivated the case. The Trial Court abused its discretion 
by failing to hold the hearing and oral argument requested by the 
Appellant pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. Finally, the Trial Court erred as a matter of 
law in interpreting Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Because the Trial Court abused its discretion, and to right 
the injustice that has resulted from that abuse, this Court must 
vacate the Trial Court's decision and remand this case to the 
Trial Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /o day of November, 1993. 
STEVEN C. TYCKSEN 
StdVeh C. Tycksen 
Attorney for Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A" 
4 1 
31 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 10 
Rule 10, Form of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All plead-
ings and other papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth 
the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, the name of the 
pleading or other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge to whom the 
case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action shall include the 
names of all the parties, but other pleadings and papers need only state the 
name of the first party on each side with an indication that there are other 
parties. A party whose name is not known shall be designated by any name 
and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem, unknown 
parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any interest in 
the subject matter of the action." Every pleading and other paper filed with 
the court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and bar num-
ber of any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which information 
shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first page. Every pleading shall 
state the name and address of the party for whom it is filed; this information 
shall appear in the lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading. 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense 
shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be 
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; 
and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. 
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each de-
fense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense when-
ever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth. 
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading may be 
adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another 
pleading, or in any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all 
purposes. 
(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings and other pa-
pers filed with the court, except printed documents or other exhibits, shall be 
typewritten, printed or photocopied in black type on good, white, unglazed 
paper of letter size (8 W x 11"), with a top margin of not less than 2 inches 
above any typed material, a left-hand margin of not less than 1 inch, a right-
hand margin of not less than one-half inch, and a bottom margin of not less 
than one-half inch. All typing or printing shall be clearly legible, ^shall be 
double-spaced, except for matters customarily single-spaced or indented, and 
shall not be smaller than pica size. Typing or printing shall appear on one side 
of the page only. 
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed under all signature 
lines, and all signatures shall be made in permanent black or blue ink. 
(f) Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk of the 
court shall examine all pleadings and other papers filed with the court. If they 
are not prepared in conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing 
but may require counsel to substitute properly prepared papers for noncon-
forming papers. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements of this 
rule for parties appearing pro se. For good cause shown, the court may relieve 
any party of any requirement of this rule. 
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper 
filed in any action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or 
without notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the 
original. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1983; April 1, 1990.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — As a general 
matter, Rule 10 deals with the form of papers 
filed with the court — both "pleadings" as de-
fined in Rule 7(a) and "other papers filed with 
the court," including motions, memoranda, dis-
covery responses, and orders. The changes in 
the present rule were promulgated to clarify 
ambiguities in the prior rule and to address 
specific problems encountered by the courts. 
Paragraphs (b), (c) and (e) of the rule were not 
changed, except that paragraph (e) was redes-
ignated as (g) and new paragraphs (e) and (0 
were added. 
Paragraph (a). This paragraph specifies re-
Rule 41 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 100 
ner, there was no abuse in the district court's to cross-examination, the purely speculative 
denial of plaintiffs second motion. Hill v. need for a third witness did not entitle the de-
Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). fendant to the granting of a motion for contin-
Need. uance. State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109 
Where the defendant's counsel had three (Utah 1985). 
weeks to prepare for trial, and where two of the -,., , . m, , ™ ,
 cnn n « j ™n 
., * * , ,, . ' «* * *. u- Cited in Thorley v. Thorley, 579 P.2d 927 
witnesses, purportedly important to his case, J J 
were actually present at trial and thus subject 
(Utah 1978). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance ness in civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. 
§ 1 et seq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 76, 80, 83, Continuance of civil case as conditioned 
84. upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses 
C.J.S. — 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.; incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144. 
88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 18 to 35. K eY Numbers. — Continuance «=» 1 et seq.; 
A.L.R. — Admissions to prevent contin- Trial <s=> 1 to 7. 
uance sought to secure testimony of absent wit-
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of 
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or 
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismis-
sal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless other-
wise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is with-
out prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions 
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defen-
dant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the 
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the 
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this 
paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For, failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order Of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, 
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation 
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in 
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The 
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of 
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indis-
pensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The 
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
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pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at 
the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order 
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem 
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has 
complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a 
party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been 
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provi-
sional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party 
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained. 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (<i) 
of this rule are substantially similar to Rule 
41, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Costs of previously dismissed action. 
—Attorney fees. 
Counterclaim. 
—Lack of prosecution. 
Involuntary dismissal. 
—Appeal. 
-Standard of review. 
Time limits. 
—Directed verdict distinguished. 
Findings and conclusions. 
—Effect. 
—Evidence to be considered. 
—Federal rules. 
—Grounds. 
Failure to establish prima facie case. 
Failure to join indispensable party. 
Failure to prosecute. 
Failure to replace counsel. 
Insufficient evidence. 
Lack of jurisdiction. 
—Improper venue distinguished. 
—Procedure. 
—Reinstatement of dismissed count. 
—Water appropriation cases. 
Voluntary dismissal. 
—Action pending in another state. 
—Conditions. 
Payment of attorney's fees. 
—Court's discretion. 
—Laches. 
—Two-dismissal rule. 
Second dismissal. 
Quashing of previous summons. 
Cited. 
Costs of previously dismissed action. 
—Attorney fees. 
Imposition of attorney fees as condition prec-
edent to permitting filing of fourth amended 
complaint was not error. Tebbs & Tebbs v 
Oliveto, 123 Utah 158, 256 P.2d 699 (1953). 
Counterclaim. 
—Lack of prosecution. 
Where, in cause of action arising in 1956, th^ 
trial court's judgment was reversed by the Su-
preme Court in 1968 and the cause remandecl 
for a new trial, but neither party filed any 
pleading after remand until 1975, at which 
time plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss defen-
dant's counterclaim for lack of prosecution, the 
trial court acted within its discretion in grant-
ing the motion. Reliance Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. 
Caine, 555 P.2d 276 (Utah 1976). 
Involuntary dismissal. 
—Appeal. 
Standard of review. 
In reviewing a dismissal which is granted 
against a plaintiff, the court must review all of 
the evidence, together with every logical infer-
ence which may fairly be drawn therefrom, in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Martin 
v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 747 (1952). 
When a trial court has made findings and 
entered judgment thereon, it is the appellate 
court's duty to review the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the findings, which must be 
allowed to stand if reasonable minds could 
agree with them. Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R., 
3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d 335 (1955); Child v. 
Hayward, 16 Utah 2d 351, 400 P.2d 758 (1965). 
Where the trial court granted defendant's 
motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff 
had failed to show any right to relief but no 
findings of fact as authorized by Subdivision 
(b) were made, the question on appeal was 
whether the plaintiffs evidence, when consid-
ered in the light most favorable to him, showed 
that he was entitled to relief. Davis v. Payne & 
Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960). 
Where the trial court granted defendant's 
motion to dismiss and elected to make findings 
as authorized by Subdivision (b), review of the 
evidence on appeal would be in the light most 
favorable to the findings. Petty v. Gindy Mfg. 
Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30 (1965); 
Petrie v. General Contracting Co., 17 Utah 2d 
408, 413 P.2d 600 (1966). 
In reviewing involuntary dismissals, the ap-
pellate court must give great weight to the 
findings made and the inferences drawn by the 
trial judge, but must reject his findings if 
clearly erroneous. On the other hand, it does 
not defer to conclusions of law but reviews 
$73 RULES OF PRACTICE — U.S. DISTRICT COURT Rule 103-4 
(J) Failure to Register. Attorneys who do not register with the court, who 
foil to pay the required fee on an annual basis, or who otherwise fail to notify 
*he court of their intentions shall receive notice via certified mail at their last-
known address from the clerk of court that their right to practice in this court 
^ 1 be summarily suspended if they do not comply with the registration 
jeouirements within thirty (30) days of the mailing of such notice. Attorneys 
go suspended shall be ineligible to practice in this court until their member-
jjjjp has been reinstated under such terms as the court may direct, including 
application and payment of any delinquent registration fees and payment of 
guch additional amount as the court may direct. 
Rule 103-3. Attorneys — Appearances by Attorneys. 
(a) Attorney of Record. The filing of any pleading, unless otherwise speci-
fied, shall constitute an appearance by the person who signs such pleading, 
and such person shall be considered counsel or party pro se of record in that 
matter. If an attorney's appearance has not been established previously by the 
filing of papers in the action or proceeding, such attorney shall file with the 
derk a notice of appearance promptly upon undertaking the representation of 
any party or witness in any court or grand jury proceedings. The form of such 
notice shall follow the example included in these rules as Appendix A. An 
attorney of record shall be deemed responsible in all matters before and after 
judgment until the time for appeal from a judgment has expired or a judgment 
has become final after appeal or until there has been a formal withdrawal 
from or substitution in the case. 
(b) Notification of Clerk. In all cases, counsel and parties appearing pro 
se shall notify the clerk's office of any change in address or telephone number. 
(c) Appearance by Party. Whenever a party has appeared by an attorney, 
that party cannot appear or act thereafter in its own behalf in the action or 
take any steps therein unless an order of substitution first shall have been 
made by the court after notice to the attorney of each such party and to the 
opposing party. However, notwithstanding that such party has appeared or is 
represented by an attorney, at its discretion the court may hear a party in 
open court. The attorney who has appeared of record for any party shall 
(1) represent such party in the action; 
(2) be recognized by the court and by all parties to the action as having 
control of the client's case; and 
(3) sign all papers that are to be signed on behalf of the client. 
Rule 103-4. Withdrawal or Removal of Attorney. 
(a) Withdrawal and Substitution. No attorney shall be permitted to with-
draw or be substituted as attorney of record in any pending action except by 
written application and by order of the court. All applications for withdrawal 
•tall set forth the reasons therefor, together with the name, address, and 
telephone number of the client, as follows: 
(1) With Client's Consent. Where the withdrawing attorney has ob-
tained the written consent of the client, such consent shall be submitted 
with the application and shall be accompanied by a separate proposed 
written order and may be presented to the court ex parte. The withdraw-
ing attorney shall give prompt notice of the entry of such order to the 
client and to all other parties or their attorneys. For attorneys represent-
ing the United States or any agency thereof, it shall not be necessary for 
the client's signature to appear on the application provided that the cli-
ent's consent to the withdrawal and substitution of counsel is acknowl-
edged by counsel for all parties. 
(2) Without Client's Consent. Where the withdrawing attorney has not 
obtained the written consent of the client, the application shall be in the 
form of a motion that shall be served upon the client and all other parties 
or their attorneys. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate of the 
OPERATION OF THE COURTS Rule 4-501 
the decision. Judicial review shall be governed by the procedures set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l5. 
fended effective January 15,1990; April 15,1991; January 1,1992; Febru-
£2, 1993.) 
yimendment Notes. — The 1990 amend, a business or corporation, a statement that the 
^ t renumbered this rule, formerly Rule business or corporation" to the introductory 
^405; added the phrase beginning "and to" un. language of paragraph (C) and made stylistic 
# "Applicability'; added "Upon initial applu
 c h a n g e s ; reWrote Subdivision (2) to delete lan-
irfon, and thereafter to the beginning of Sub- ^ ^
 relating t 0 appraisals and inserted "pre-
^ o n (1); m Subdivision (1)(C) inserted the
 p a r e d b y a certified public accountant"; redes-
^ v i s i o n designation (1) and added Subdm. j
 M former S u b d i v i s i o n ( 2 ) ( C ) a s p r e s e n t 
*"» <"• ^ o u f e S ' ^ l f r e , f Subdivision (3), added present Subdivision (4), 
jBbdivision (1XD) as Subdivisxon l)(C)(xni): a n d renunlbered t h e r e m a i n i n g subdivisions 
—Animated former Subdivision (1)(E) as Sub- _,. , , . .",
 r 
S ( D ( D ) ; redesignated former Subdivi. a ' c o r d m e * making appropriate reference 
S (1XF) through (J) as Subdivision, S f T f ^ K » ^ f 1 ^ ^ T ^ 
J g w i i ) through (xii) and in Subdivision (3)' ?,?let*d l^e**efoTe *?**?* s tate,; 
25i) substituted "existing in Utah or any mentL a » d substituted surety for company 
T r state" for "in any court of the state"; m t h e first sentence and substituted the 
JSed Subdivisions (2)(A) through (C), (3), (4), v a l u e " f o r "a r a t i o o f b o n d d o l l a r s t o l e t t e r o f 
god (5)(A) and the first two sentences in Subdi. c r e d l t dollars" in the second sentence; in 
vision (5)(B), making former Subdivision (3) Present Subdivision (5), substituted "current 
the third sentence in present Subdivision assets" for "real assets" in two places; and re-
(5KB); deleted former Subdivision (4), provide wrote present Subdivision (6) to delete a table 
tag for full faith and credit among courts fo*- setting out the ratio of bond dollars outstand-
irders qualifying sureties; redesignated former ing to net worth value. 
Subdivisions (5) through (7) as Subdivisions The 1992 amendment substituted "Commer-
(5XC) and (D) and (6); substituted "circuit" for cial" for "qualifications of in the rule heading, 
'court" in Subdivision (5)(C); substituted "pre- inserted "re-qualification and disqualification" 
riding judge" for "court" in two places in Subdi- and "commercial" in the Intent section, and 
fision (5)(D); substituted "March 1st" for "Feb- substantially rewrote the rule, 
luary 28th" in Subdivision (6); added Subdi vi- The 1993 amendment, effective February 1, 
lion (7); and made stylistic changes through- 1993, in Subdivision (6) added the designation 
art. (A), deleted "the lesser of $500,000 or" after 
The 1991 amendment in Subdivision (1) "exceed" in Subdivision (A), and added Subdi-
vided "or if the statement is made on behalf of vision (B). 
Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record. 
Intent: 
To designate locations of trial courts of record. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby desig-
nated as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar 
City; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy; 
aalem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City. 
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record of any 
object matter jurisdiction may hold <>ourt in any location designated by this 
*ule. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-501. Motions, 
latent: 
To establish a uniform procedure fo>- filing motions, supporting memoranda 
*&& documents with the court. 
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To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts 
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims de-
partment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncon-
tested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by 
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or 
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte appli-
cation is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall 
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is 
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day 
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in 
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit 
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all 
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authori-
ties in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and author-
ities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those por-
tions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applies 
ble, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts 
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be 
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifi-
cally controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at 
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition 
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the 
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has 
been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the 
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the 
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies 
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time 
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties 
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days be-
fore the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's 
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without 
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments 
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- the proposed order" following "supporting doc-
ment rewrote this rule to such an extent that a umentation" m Subdivision (l)(b) and made re-
detailed description is impracticable. lated stylistic changes and inserted "principal" 
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of m Subdivision (3)(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS should have been given ten days to respond, as 
When rule applies prescribed by Subdivision (1Kb) of this rule. 
Cited Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct. 
w. ,. App. 1991). 
When rule applies. 
Because the defendants'Rule 56(e> objection Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a (Utah 1991); Lucero v. Warden of Utah State 
separate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff Prison, 841 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Rule 4-506 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 884 
Principal Amount of Judgment, Attorneys' Fees 
Exclusive of Costs, Between: Allowed 
1,500.01 2,000.00 325.00 
2,000.01 2,500.00 400.00 
2,500.01 3,000.00 475.00 
3,000.01 3,500.00 550.00 
3,500.01 4,000.00 625.00 
4,000.01 4,500.00 700.00 
4,500.01 5,000.00 775.00 
(2) Reference to this rule and the amount of attorneys' fees allowed pursu. 
ant to paragraph (1) shall be stated with particularity in the body or prayer of 
the complaint. 
(3) When a statute provides the basis for the award of attorneys' fees, refer-
ence to the statutory authority shall be included in the complaint. 
(4) Clerks may enter civil default judgments which include attorneys' fees 
awarded pursuant to this rule. 
(5) Attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this rule may be augmented after 
judgment pursuant to Rule 4-505. When the court considers a motion for 
augmentation of attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this rule, it shall con-
sider the attorneys' time spent prior to the entry of judgment, the amount of 
attorneys' fees included in the judgment, and the statements contained in the 
affidavit supporting the motion for augmentation. 
(6) Prior to entry of a judgment which grants attorneys' fees pursuant to 
this rule, any party may move the court to depart from the fees allowed by 
paragraph (1) of this rule. Such application shall be made pursuant to Rule 
4-505. 
(7) If a contract or other document provides for an award of attorneys' fees, 
an original or copy of the document shall be made a part of the file before 
attorneys' fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule. 
(8) No affidavit for attorneys' fees need be filed in order to receive an award 
of attorneys' fees pursuant to this rule. 
(Added effective March 31, 1992.) 
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of counsel in 
civil cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceedings in trial courts of 
record except guardians ad litem and court-appointed counsel. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney may 
withdraw as counsel of record without the approval of the court except when 
(a) a motion has been filed and is pending before the court or (b) a certificate of 
readiness for trial has been filed. Under these circumstances, an attorney may 
not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. 
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, written notice of the 
withdrawal must be served upon the client of the withdrawing attorney and 
upon all other parties not in default and a certificate of service must be filed 
with the court. If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal served 
upon the client shall include a notification of the trial date. 
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from 
the case or ceases to act as an attorney, opposing counsel must notify, i n 
writing, the unrepresented client of his/her responsibility to retain another 
attorney or appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate further 
lings against the client. A copy of the written notice shall be filed with 
Etfur t and no further proceedings shall be held in the matter until 20 days 
elapsed from the date of filing, 
fended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
^Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- 'This rule shall apply to all trial courts of 
J ^ added "Consistent with the Rules of Pro- record and not of record"; and in Subdivision 
S o n a l Conduct" to Subdivision (1) and, in (1) substituted the present language beginning 
Sjivision (3), inserted "in writing" in the with "without the approval of the court" for "in 
JJtsentence and added the second sentence, all cases except for withdrawal would result in 
<flie 1991 amendment, in the Applicability delay of trial. In that case, an attorney may not 
action, substituted the present language for withdraw without the approval of the court." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Rule 4-507, Disposition of funds on trustee's sale. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing trustee affidavits of deposit and 
claimant petitions for adjudication of priority in trustee's sales. 
To establish a uniform procedure in determining the disposition of funds on 
trustee's sales. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the Court any proceeds from 
a trustee's sale in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-29, the 
trustee shall file an affidavit with the clerk setting forth the facts of the 
deposit and a list of all known claimants, including known addresses. The 
clerk shall notify the listed claimants within 10 days of receiving the affidavit 
of deposit. 
(2) Any claimant may then file a petition for adjudication of priority to 
these funds and request a hearing before the court. The petitioner requesting 
the hearing shall give notice of the hearing to all claimants listed in the 
trustee's affidavit of deposit and any others known to the petitioner. All per-
sons having or claiming an interest must appear and assert their claim or be 
barred thereafter. 
(3) Pursuant to the determination hearing, the court will establish the 
priorities of the parties to the trustee's sale proceeds and enter an order with 
the clerk of the court or county treasurer directing the disbursement of funds 
as determined. 
Rule 4-508. Unpublished opinions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform standard for the use of unpublished opinions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value 
and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for purposes of 
applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 
(Added effective January 15, 1990.) 
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cause, by filing a notice of withdrawal. Such notice shall state (a) 
date of entry of final decree or judgment, (b) the last known address 
of such party, (c) that such attorney withdraws as attorney for such 
party. A copy of such notice shall be mailed to such party at his last 
known address and shall be served upon the adverse party. 
(Added by Stats.1963, c. 1333, p. 2856, § 1. Amended by Stats.1969, c. 
1608, p. 3344, § 10, operative Jan. 1,1970.) 
Historical Note 
The 1969 amendment substituted in the Operative date of Stats.1969, c. 1608, 
first sentence "dissolution of marriage, le- see Historical Note under § 125. 
gal separation, or for a declaration of 
void or voidable marriage" for "divorce, 
separate , maintenance or annulment." 
Forms 
See West's California Code Forms, Civil Procedure. 
Law Review Commentaries 
Background and general effect of 1963 
addition. (1963) 38 S. Bar J. 661. 
Library References 
Attorney and Client <§=>76(1). Family Law Practice, Goddard, §§ 589, 
C.J.S. Attorney and Client §§ 221, 231. 590. 
Notes of Decisions 
following procedure prescribed in §§ 284 
and 285 for discharge of attorney, service 
of subsequent pleadings are nevertheless 
properly made on attorney. Forslund v. 
Forslund (1964) 37 Cal.Rptr. 489, 225 C. 
A.2d 476. 
3. Finality of judgment 
While authority of attorney ordinarily 
ends with entry of judgment, except for 
purpose of enforcing it or having it set 
aside or reversed, judgment of divorce, in-
sofar as it relates to custody and mainte-
nance of minor children, is not final but 
litigation is regarded as still pending and 
service may yet be made on attorney. 
Forslund v. Forslund (1964) 37 Cal.Rptr. 
489, 225 C.A.2d 476. 
§ 2 8 6 . Death, removal, etc.; new appointment or appearance in 
person 
When an attorney dies, or is removed or suspended, or ceases to 
act as such, a party to an action, for whom he was acting as attor-
ney, must, before any further proceedings are had against him, be re-
564 
In general I 
Appearance In propria persona 2 
Finality of judgment 3 
I. In general 
Client can discharge attorney of record 
at any time and substitute another in his 
place, but to do so he must conform to §§ 
284, 285 and this section. Forslund v. 
Forslund (1964) 37 Cal.Rptr. 489. 225 C. 
A.2d 476. 
2. Appearance in propria persona 
Where party who has appeared in ac-
tion by attorney thereafter takes part in 
proceedings in propria persona without 
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quired by the adverse party, by written notice, to appoint another at-
torney, or to appear in person. 
(Enacted 1872. Amended by Code Am.1880, c. 35, p. 57, § 1.) 
Historical Note 
The reenactraent of 1880 changed only 
the punctuation. 
Forms 
See West's California Code Forms, Civil Procedure. 
Cross References 
Suspension or removal of attorney, see Business and Professions Code § 6100 et seq. 
Library References 
Attorney and Client <§=>75. 76. C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 231. 
Notes of Decisions 
In general I 
Limitation of actions 7 
Personal appearance by party 4 
Power of the court 3 
Purpose 2 
Representation by other counsel 
Suspension or removal of attorney 
Waiver of notice 8 
1. In general 
This section applies only when attorney 
has died or ceased to be attorney and not 
when he ceased to act for his client in 
particular case. California Water Service 
Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc. 
(1964) 37 Cal.Rptr. 1, 224 C.A.2d 715. 
This section does not apply where attor-
ney has ceased to act for client in partic-
ular case. Gion v. Stroud (1961) 12 Cal. 
Rptr. 540, 191 C.A^d 277. 
The phrase "ceases to act as such," as 
used in this section providing that, when 
an attorney ceases to act as such, party 
for whom he was acting as attorney must 
be required by adverse party by written 
notice to appoint another attorney or ap-
pear in person, contemplates that notice 
be given when attorney ceases to practice 
as an attorney rather than when he ceas-
es to act as an attorney in a particular 
piece of litigation. Jones v. Green (1946) 
168 P.2d 418, 74 C.A 2d 223. 
2. Purpose 
Purpose of this section is to provide no-
tice to a party who might otherwise be 
taken unawares. California Water Serv-
ice Co. v. Edward Sidebotham & Son, Inc. 
(1964) 37 Cal.Rptr. 1, 224 C.A.2d 715. 
3. Power of the court 
If defendant's attorney exhibits objec-
tive evidence of physical incapacity to 
proceed with meaningful defense of client, 
such as illness, intoxication, or nervous 
breakdown, court should inquire into mat-
ter on its own motion and if necessary re-
lieve affected counsel and order a substitu-
tion; yet even that action should be taken 
with great circumspection and after all 
reasonable alternatives, such as granting 
of continuance, have been exhausted; fail-
ure to observe these standards will compel 
reversal of ensuing judgment; and this re-
sult will follow regardless of whether 
substituted counsel was competent or 
whether defendant received "fair trial". 
Smith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
Countv (1968) 68 Cal.Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 
65, 68 C.A. 547. 
Under this section trial court, in ab-
sence of written notice requiring defendant 
to appoint another attorney after his 
original attorney has ceased to act, and in 
absence of defendant or any attorney, was 
without authority to proceed with the 
trial. McMunn v. Lehrke (1915) 155 P. 
473. 29 C.A. 298. 
Though this section provides that, when 
an attornev dies, a party to an action, for 
whom he was acting, must be required by 
the adverse party, by written notice, to 
appoint another attorney, or appear in 
person, before any further proceedings 
are had against him, failure of a defend-
ant to give such notice to a plaintiff 
whose attorney had died will not deprive 
the court of jurisdiction to dismiss an ac-
tion for want of prosecution where plain-
tiff appointed another attorney before the 
commencement of the proceedings. Xicol 
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